

**Harnessing the
Military's Voice: An
Argument For A
Greater Role In Public
Diplomacy By The U.S.
Military**

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National Security Program
Discussion Paper Series

Harvard University

John F. Kennedy School
of Government

National Security Program

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 01 JUN 2006		2. REPORT TYPE Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2006	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Harnessing the Military's Voice An Argument for a Greater Role in Public Diplomacy by the U.S. Military				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Robin Campbell; Annette Foster; Steven Smith				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA, 02138				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See Attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 82	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Harvard University, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Air National Guard, or the United States Army.

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Executive Summary

*"If we are going to be successful long-term in the war on terror and in the broader objective of promoting freedom and democracy in that part of the world, we have to get the public diplomacy piece of it right. Up until now, that has been a very weak part of our arsenal."*¹

- Vice President Dick Cheney

Since 9/11 many articles have been written, studies undertaken and recommendations made in an effort to repair America's hemorrhaging public diplomacy (PD) capabilities. However, these efforts, intended to serve as holistic reviews of the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus, fail to adequately address the existing shortcomings within the Department of Defense (DoD) or, more importantly, to truly explore methods to better harness the military's significant potential to enhance the country's public diplomacy capability. Its size, budget and overseas presence make DoD perhaps the most powerful voice for U.S. public diplomacy, which in turn warrant a more detailed and critical review of its role and capabilities.

To gain a full understanding of the issues and gather information relevant to making the recommendations included in the report, the authors conducted:

- A thorough review of existing public diplomacy studies, draft directives, policy proposals and scholarly writings, with particular focus on those findings and recommendations that addressed the military
- A review of existing doctrine and training programs to discern the extent to which they addressed public diplomacy
- Interviews with relevant DoD, Department of State (DoS), Defense Science Board (DSB) and other agency officials and public diplomacy experts to gain insights into current efforts and challenges associated with DoD's attempts to define its public diplomacy role

- Interviews with selected military leaders to garner insights from their personal experiences during recent deployments

The authors then analyzed the available data to determine the key findings suggested by the information and developed a set of specific recommendations matched to each of the findings. This study, while not sufficiently comprehensive to address every aspect of DoD's public diplomacy task, does discern a number of significant issues that, if addressed, would likely improve both the military's ability to win "hearts and minds" and the U.S. Government's public diplomacy efforts.

Findings and Recommendations

Finding: The Department of Defense does not fully acknowledge a direct public diplomacy role for itself.

Some Pentagon officials claiming that the military role is simply "Support to Public Diplomacy" does not go far enough to define a more robust role for the military in PD. Public diplomacy is by design a collaborative effort involving U.S. governmental and non-governmental institutions with the goal of improving the understanding of U.S. culture, values and policies within foreign populations.

The growing opposition to U.S. policies is problematic to this country's success in a host of endeavors, not the least of which is its nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism. While DoD is beginning to recognize and catalog the complexities associated with the current reality, it is struggling to develop a neat solution. It is likely that any solution will require DoD to overcome its natural reluctance and venture deeper into what it had previously considered the exclusive realm of the diplomat.

Recommendation 1: DoD should acknowledge and embrace a direct role in public diplomacy.

As a starting point, DoD should acknowledge, accept and embrace a direct PD role. Notwithstanding existing programs (combined exercises with allied nations, officer and small unit exchanges, and the various engagement programs within the Regional Combatant Commands), DoD's potential for PD is much greater than has been realized, especially within an operational environment. The value of gaining the support of the local population has long been acknowledged by strategic planners and military professionals alike. As a critical component to both war fighting and nation-building, PD must be pursued rigorously – not only by the State Department, but across the government. DoD should focus on the more substantive task of providing a PD capability to its forces which, as a by-product, may help stem the tide of a rising negative world view of the U.S. Once DoD acknowledges and embraces its role in public diplomacy, the remaining recommendations suggest areas for further examination to formalize the U.S. military's public diplomacy mission.

Finding: DoD needs to conduct a thorough appraisal of the military's PD requirements, capabilities and activities.

Most recent public diplomacy studies have focused on identifying problems and recommending fixes for the national-level strategy, policy apparatus and broadcast capabilities. A review of any one of these studies will almost assuredly mention the need for an over-arching national level communications strategy, additional senior-level public diplomacy officials, new and/or improved interagency policy coordinating structures, increased national-level broadcast media capabilities, and additional funding.

The Defense Science Board's (DSB) report, Strategic Communications, published in September 2004, is one important example. Only two of the report's seven major recommendations directly addresses the military and then only at the most senior levels. The DSB's previous report on the subject, Managed Information Dissemination, published in October 2001, is similarly top-down focused although it does more directly address the military.

While the publication of another Presidential Directive or the creation of an additional Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense may prove necessary, the more immediate need is to provide public diplomacy experts at the ground force level. DoD should not predicate changes at the ground force level on accomplishing the national level recommendations in these two reports.

Recommendation 2: DoD should undertake a detailed bottom-up review of the military's current public diplomacy requirements, needs, and capabilities.

DoD in a detailed bottom-up review should identify shortfalls that limit the ability of ground force commanders, especially at the Brigade and Battalion level, to most effectively influence the host nation constituencies residing outside the gates of their forward operating bases.²

Recommendation 3: The Secretary of Defense should designate a DoD and Service lead for public diplomacy.

The Secretary of Defense should immediately designate a lead for public diplomacy. Following the combined recommendations of the Defense Science Board's Strategic Communications and Managed Information Dissemination reports would be prudent. In addition, the Secretary should designate from among the ground services (Army or Marine Corps) a PD lead to develop the requisite force structure (personnel and equipment), training and doctrine.

Finding: The U.S. military lacks military professionals trained in and capable of executing public diplomacy.

DoD considers Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as distinct communication components within its strategic communications rubric. While it acknowledges that each is vital, it has chosen only to field two of them, PSYOP and PA, as bonafide military specialties. It has neither acknowledged PD as a military specialty nor assigned that responsibility to any other existing branch or specialty.³

Thus, the military finds itself executing PD activities without any organic expertise in the field. Instead it has become reliant upon dual-hatted specialists, “sub-contracted” from existing disciplines. Ground force commanders below the Joint Task Force-level, that is to say those without a resident State Department representative, have no single expert to whom they can turn for reliable and quality public diplomacy counsel. The result is a relatively weak capability diffused among a variety of specialties with no one at the helm.

Recommendation 4: DoD should establish a public diplomacy career field.

The military should establish a public diplomacy career field with the goal of providing a true PD capability down to the Battalion Task Force level. Notwithstanding Congressional desire for broad-based improvement in cultural awareness and language proficiency across the military, the mechanics and resources necessary to implement a military-wide improvement in cultural understanding and language capability would be daunting. The development of a PD capability would provide a targeted and more efficient way to begin to get at these much needed reforms.

Such specialists would serve as staff advisors to their commanders, instructors to the unit’s Soldiers and junior leaders, and as the chief architects/overseers for the unit’s local public diplomacy efforts. The public diplomacy elements at each echelon should be vertically and

horizontally linked to ensure consistency of message, share information and interpret results. Linkage should continue up through the appropriate Regional Combatant Command level, which itself would be tied into the national-level PD architecture. At the most senior military levels, these elements should interface directly with the State Department Political Advisors (POLADs) already serving within our Regional Combatant Commands, Combined Joint Task Forces, and, in the case of Iraq, as far down as Division level.

In conjunction with the Services and Department of State (DoS), DoD should identify the best “source(s)” from which to build this public diplomacy corps. A variety of viable options exist that could provide the necessary capability without unduly growing either the military or DoS. Such options include the creation of a specific public diplomacy military occupation specialty (MOS) within the Civil Affairs, Public Affairs or PSYOP disciplines; establishment of an entirely new public diplomacy branch; or creation of a combined public diplomacy capability composed of both military and civilian specialists. It is beyond the scope of this report to provide a definitive manning concept, but rather to suggest the concept to those already engaged in the development of the future force structure.

Finding: The military lacks specific training and doctrine necessary for the conduct of public diplomacy.

There is an obvious absence of discussion relevant to the conduct of public diplomacy in current military doctrine and training. Existing programs of instruction for the military’s pseudo-public diplomacy specialists (Public Affairs, PSYOP and Civil Affairs) provide scant mention of the subject. Existing military doctrine is equally lacking.

While meetings with role players acting as local civilian leaders are becoming more common in training scenarios, formal training on how to conduct public diplomacy is not. Without

specific public diplomacy training and doctrine, the well intentioned U.S. military unit may unintentionally communicate messages or information that is off target, misinterpreted, or even antagonizing.

Recommendation 5: DoD should develop a public diplomacy program of instruction.

DoD should direct the development of a program of instruction for public diplomacy specialists (knowledge and performance competency) as well as for military leaders and service members (familiarization). Using existing State Department lesson plans, operational lessons learned and DoD's existing language, cultural, and communications training programs, an effective public diplomacy program of instruction can and should be developed.

Recommendation 6: DoD should develop and promulgate public diplomacy doctrine.

In concert with DoS and experts in the field, DoD should develop, publish, and promulgate public diplomacy doctrine, focused primarily on the tactics, techniques and procedures that will serve as a “how to” guide for the forces in the field from the strategic to tactical level.

Finding: The military lacks specific measures of effectiveness to assess the efficacy of its public diplomacy efforts.

The military's overseas public diplomacy efforts, especially in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, do not include an established method to measure their efficacy. This systemic shortfall in the military's efforts echoes similar shortfalls identified in the broader public diplomacy community as noted in the many public diplomacy studies. Similar to its targeting methodology of “decide-detect-deliver-assess,” in which a post strike assessment is made to determine whether a kinetic attack achieved the desired outcome, post-PD measurements would greatly assist commanders and planners in ensuring limited PD resources are most effectively and efficiently employed.

Recommendation 7: DoD should develop clear measures of effectiveness.

DoD should develop clear measures of effectiveness against the training and performance objectives of a new public diplomacy specialty; tap private community experts to help further define measures; and develop an inter-active data base for vertical and horizontal sharing of measures of effectiveness.

Conclusion

In reviewing much of the recent PD discourse, the U.S. should heed the two truisms that seem to rise above the cacophony of ideas and opinions. First, there is no silver bullet. Rather, the best approach is one which relies upon multiple means to demonstrate that America's actions and policies are not undertaken with callous disregard for the needs and cultures of foreign audiences. Second, that the efficacy of any PD effort will not be realized immediately, but rather will manifest itself over the long-term.

In heeding the first, the U.S. Government (USG) should take James Fallows' advice that because it is impossible to know which message or medium will resonate best with foreign audiences, we should "use every tool we have".⁴ In heeding the second, the USG should begin to identify and implement improvements to public diplomacy staying focused on the long-term results. Harnessing the military's voice is one such improvement that warrants a second look.

Chapter 1: Introduction: Harnessing The Military's Voice

*"Just as our diplomatic institutions must adapt so that we can reach out to others, we also need a different and more comprehensive approach to public information efforts that can help people around the world learn about and understand America."*⁵

- President George W. Bush

"Public Diplomacy" can be viewed as any U.S. activity designed to generate foreign public support for U.S. policies. It includes efforts to inform, educate and influence a foreign audience to be more accepting or at least understanding of the rationale behind U.S. policy goals and objectives.⁶ For most of modern history, and certainly throughout the Cold War, public diplomacy was recognized as an essential aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Following the end of the Cold War and for a variety of reasons, the U.S. cut public diplomacy funding and human resources. The gutting of the Nation's public diplomacy capability culminated in the dissolution of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999 and the reorganization of its capabilities into what is now the State Department's Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.⁷

During the same period that saw the reduction of the country's public diplomacy capability, the U.S. deployed and employed its military in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Military involvement went beyond the traditional and comparatively easy role of combat into the much more complex and rigorous endeavor of nation-building. Successful nation-building efforts are dependant in part on U.S. public diplomacy and the military's mission was made immeasurably more difficult with the cuts made in public diplomacy. As the PD capability continued to wither over time, military ground forces found themselves taking up the slack but lacking the expertise to do so most effectively.⁸

A number of recent studies and reports have been highly critical of the U.S. capability to conduct public diplomacy.⁹ However, these studies and reports, intended to serve as holistic reviews of the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus, fail to adequately address the existing shortcomings within DoD or, more importantly, to truly explore methods to better harness the military's significant potential to enhance the country's public diplomacy capability. Barry Zorthian, a retired Foreign Service officer and member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, faulted his own task force's efforts, writing in part:

*"I do not believe the Task Force report as a whole gives sufficient attention to the impact of the U.S. military, and certainly of the Pentagon, in forming foreign public opinion about American policies and actions. This is particularly true in such developments as Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. military is present in one way or another in over 60 countries. What the Pentagon says or what local commanders and units do has an enormous impact on the reaction of foreign publics, and hence foreign governments, to the United States."*¹⁰

Mr. Zorthian's observation on the lack of attention to the impact of the U.S. military is equally applicable to most of the other recent public diplomacy studies, to include the Pentagon's own September 2004 Defense Science Board (DSB) report entitled Strategic Communications. The authors do not dismiss these works since each puts forth compelling arguments for change in the public diplomacy realm, but rather focusing on Mr. Zorthian's statement; suggest a more thorough exploration of the military's potential to improve U.S. public diplomacy. DoD by virtue of its size, budget and overseas presence is perhaps the most powerful voice for U.S. public diplomacy and the authors propose a more detailed and critical review of its role and capabilities in these arena.

This study, while not sufficiently comprehensive to address every aspect of DoD's public diplomacy task, does point out a number of significant issues that, if addressed, would likely improve the current state of affairs. Specifically it will answer the fundamental question: What steps are necessary for the U.S. to better harness the public diplomacy capability resident within

Department of Defense without supplanting the Department of State's lead role for the U.S. Government?

The authors argue that the U.S. can better realize the significant public diplomacy potential of its military forces. Provided with doctrine, tools and training, U.S. military forces could become a powerful force to improve overall public diplomacy.

Study Methodology

The authors undertook the following steps to gain a full understanding of the problem and to gather the information necessary to recommend possible remediation:

- A thorough review of existing public diplomacy studies, draft directives, policy proposals and scholarly writings, with particular focus on those findings and recommendations that addressed the military
- A review of existing doctrine and training programs to discern the extent to which they addressed public diplomacy
- Interviews with relevant DoD, Department of State (DoS), Defense Science Board and other agency officials and public diplomacy experts to gain insights into current efforts and challenges associated with DoD's attempts to define its public diplomacy role
- Interviews with selected military leaders to garner insights from their personal experiences during recent deployments

The authors then analyzed the available data to determine the key findings suggested by the information. Finally, the authors developed a set of specific recommendations matched to each of the aforementioned findings in an effort to propose ways in which the U.S. might better harness its military's public diplomacy potential.

Chapter 2: Defining The Military's Role

The military's civilian and military leadership must better define its role in public diplomacy consistent with the President's desire for a "more comprehensive approach to public information efforts." To do so will require it to: overcome the culture and mindset that have thus far limited its public diplomacy efficacy; accept that as a collaborative U.S. government endeavor, public diplomacy requires direct DoD involvement; and fully assess the capabilities it can and should legitimately bring to bear in support of the overall U.S. effort without unduly burdening an already busy force.

Organizational Resistance

While the U.S. maintains a considerable overseas military presence, most notably during times of crisis, it rightly strives to keep them focused on their role as combatants. Thus, in a nation-building environment the military gives primacy to the fundamental tasks of establishing and maintaining security in order to facilitate the critical follow-on activities of other governmental, non-governmental and international agencies.

Military commanders endeavor to steer clear of tasks not perceived essential to their core task, most typically to preclude overburdening their often already task-saturated forces. Activities not directly related to combat or security related tasks are generally given insufficient resources and attention. A Washington Post article's quote from a Civil Affairs officer concerned with the potential transfer of Army Civil Affairs and PSYOP forces from the Special Operations community to the conventional force, illustrates this notion. He states, "You'd put the [Civil Affairs] CA assets in the hands of *maneuver commanders who don't want to do the touchy-feely stuff* and don't understand it (emphasis added)."¹¹

There is also a natural hesitancy within government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DoD), to expand their roles into areas considered the responsibility of another agency or department.¹² Existing laws (31 USC 1535 and 1536, 1982)¹³, regulations and other governmental provisions are intended to preclude this sort of “bleed over” in order to avoid wasting taxpayer dollars with redundant and possibly competing capabilities within the government. Public diplomacy is a case in point having clearly been seen as the responsibility of the Department of State (DoS).

While acknowledging the lead role of DoS, if, as articulated in the influential Djerejian Report, “public diplomacy is the promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging and influencing people around the world,”¹⁴ then U.S. Servicemen and Women are engaging in public diplomacy activities in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas every day.

More than Just “Support”

Two of DoD’s most recent and significant efforts, the limited release Information Operations (IO) Roadmap and last summer’s Defense Science Board study and subsequent report entitled Strategic Communications, endeavor to help DoD begin to define its role in public diplomacy. However, a review of these documents and two related draft defense directives indicates that DoD is still focused on providing only tangential support to the public diplomacy activities of others through the use of its PSYOP and Public Affairs forces.

To be fair, in his foreword to the IO Roadmap, Secretary Rumsfeld makes it clear that the focus of the study is to improve the warfighting capability of the Regional Combatant Commanders and not to rectify the U.S.’ public diplomacy deficiencies. Thus, public diplomacy is addressed only as an adjunct issue within the report. Nonetheless, the IO Roadmap made the following recommendations relevant to the military and public diplomacy:

Clarify Lanes in the Road for PSYOP, Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy.

In particular:

- *PSYOP should focus on support to military endeavors (exercises, deployments and operations) in non-permissive or semi-permissive environments (i.e., when adversaries are part of the equation).*
- *DoD should collaborate with other agencies for U.S. Government public diplomacy programs and information objectives. PSYOP forces and capabilities can be employed in support of public diplomacy (e.g., as part of approved theater security cooperation guidelines.)*
- *DoD Public Affairs should be more proactive in support of U.S. Government Public Diplomacy objectives to include a broader set of select foreign media and audiences (emphasis added).¹⁵*

However, precisely because these recommendations were developed without regard for overall U.S. public diplomacy, they do not begin to harness the military's potential. Since its publication in October 2003, the "clarification of lanes" has not yet been made.

In a separate and more recent attempt to examine the country's ability to "communicate with and thereby influence the world,"¹⁶ Secretary Rumsfeld directed the Defense Science Board study and report on U.S. strategic communications. This effort was one of six subject areas included in the 2004 DSB Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities.

"Strategic communications" is described as an umbrella framework designed to bring together a number of tangentially related activities. Jeff Jones, the Senior Director for Strategic Communications and Information in the National Security Council, defined strategic communications as "The coordination of Statecraft, Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, military information and other activities, reinforced by political, economic and military actions, in a synchronized manner to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives."¹⁷

Finding a clear, definitive understanding of the strategic communication concept within DoD is somewhat more problematic, though perhaps understandable given the current government-wide struggle to come to grips with a global information environment. DoD has defined strategic communications as "the transmission of integrated and coordinated USG themes and

messages that advance US interests and policies through a synchronized interagency effort supported by public diplomacy, public affairs, and military IO, in concert with other political, economic, information and military actions.”¹⁸

The DSB itself adds to the confusion in Strategic Communications as it offers two separate component listings for the strategic communications concept within the same report. In Chapter 1 they are listed as public diplomacy, public affairs, and something referred to as open international military information (IMI).¹⁹ (IMI was the interagency term for PSYOP, first coined in the DSB’s previously released report on Managed Information Dissemination.²⁰) In “Recommendation 1,” it lists them as public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military information operations.²¹

Next, a draft of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.cc “Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities,” stated that, “Strategic communication includes the activities of public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD)²², and information operations.”²³ It then further describes its own strategic communications activities as threefold: public affairs, DSPD, and the PSYOP component of Information Operations activities. Then a draft Pentagon briefing slide, developed to graphically portray the relationships among the various components of strategic communications, subordinates DSPD and PSYOP under the rubric of IMI (see Figure 1).²⁴ This seems to belie the DSB’s assertion that IMI is simply an interagency term for PSYOP.²⁵




Figure 1²⁶

The DoD assertion that PD is not among its Strategic Communication activities is difficult to fathom. While the provision of security forces to U.S. diplomats and the use of military communications and broadcasting equipment in support of diplomatic and public service endeavors can legitimately be termed “Defense Support to Public Diplomacy,” the day to day operational interactions of Servicemen and Women with foreign publics cannot. It is unclear whether DoD truly intends for these activities to roll up under the “Defense Support to Military Diplomacy” mantle.

While the draft of DoDD 3600.1, “Information Operations” addresses and assigns specific responsibilities for the newly coined “Defense Support to Public Diplomacy” task, it fails to address public diplomacy other than to assign coordinating responsibilities at the most senior levels. This only adds to the impression that DoD does not consider PD among its strategic communications activities.

Pentagon officials involved in the development of these concepts and draft directives indicate two reasons for their tortured wording and the absence of a direct military role in public diplomacy.²⁷ First, is a concern that the State Department would feel its turf being threatened by a DoD directive telling the military to engage directly in public “diplomacy;” and second, fear that should DoD touch public diplomacy, it will overly consume time, energy and resources.

The Collaborative Reality of U.S. Public Diplomacy

Some Pentagon officials claiming that the military role is simply “Support to Public Diplomacy” does not go far enough to define a more robust role for the military in PD. Public diplomacy is by design a collaborative effort involving U.S. governmental and non-governmental institutions with the goal of improving the understanding of U.S. culture, values and policies within foreign populations.

Public diplomacy experts have long held that, while the former U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and now the Department of State serves as the lead agency for U.S. public diplomacy, it has always been a shared, interagency effort. The longstanding United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, a major element of the State Department’s Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, noted in its 2004 report that, “Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in some public diplomacy efforts.”²⁸

The U.S. General Accounting Office’s September 2003 report on public diplomacy recognized that “the U.S. government public diplomacy community primarily consists of the White House, State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency”. It also recognizes the critical role of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).²⁹ While the State Department and its Office of the Under

Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is recognized as the government lead for public diplomacy, the fact remains that the “task” properly belongs to many agencies.

Written and promulgated during the Clinton Administration (and never formally rescinded by the Bush Administration), Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68, “tasked DoD and other Federal agencies to participate in the DOS-led International Public Information (IPI) effort with their assigned Public Diplomacy (PD), Public Affairs (PA) and military Psychological Operations (PSYOP)”.³⁰ In fact, a revision of this PDD has been the keystone recommendation of many of the most recent public diplomacy studies.

All of this makes it difficult for the authors to understand how one can conclude that DoD bears no more responsibility for public diplomacy than the occasional provision of men and equipment from its PSYOP and PA force pool to support the efforts of others within the government. However, without an acknowledged public diplomacy mission along with the dedicated resources, DoD is hard pressed to do much else.

An Uncharted Course for the Way Ahead

The U.S. Army has described the new strategic context stating that, “America is a Nation at war. To win this war, *we must meld all elements of our national power* in a determined and relentless campaign to defeat enemies who challenge our way of life. . . We must prepare for the future, then, even as we relentlessly pursue those who seek the destruction of our way of life, and *while waging a prolonged war of ideas* to alter the conditions that motivate our enemies (emphasis added).”³¹ The difficulty is in moving beyond poetic descriptions of these imperatives and outlining specific steps necessary to adapt the force to this new environment.

Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita, during an interview on “Strategic Communications” with the New York Times, vividly exemplifies DoD’s uncertainty about the way ahead.

“There’s a general understanding of the principles that I talked about in the beginning, which is we’re in an environment that we need to better understand. That we’re in a world where the institutions we have don’t match the world we’re in anymore and in many ways. In some ways, they’re catching up. In other ways, they just don’t exist. And in the world of public diplomacy and the way the country communicates, that’s one area where our institutions haven’t caught up. So everybody has recognized that we’ve got a challenge to understand better how to communicate in the world that we described: instantaneous communications; combatant commanders out there in environments that are non-traditional; the use of communications by adversaries in ways that we don’t fully appreciate. And so there’s an enormous amount of thinking going on. But it’s really – I would say it’s at the refined thought stage and it’s not at the proposals for recommendation stage.”³²

The growing opposition to U.S. policies is problematic to this country’s success in a host of endeavors, not the least of which is its nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism. While DoD is beginning to recognize and catalog the complexities associated with the current reality, it is struggling to develop a neat solution. It is likely that any solution will require DoD to overcome its natural reluctance and venture deeper into what it had previously considered the exclusive realm of the diplomat.

Recommendation 1: DoD should acknowledge and embrace a direct role in public diplomacy.

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by the State Department, but across the government. DoD should focus on the more substantive task of providing a needed capability to its forces which, as a by-product, may help stem the tide of a rising negative world view of the U.S. Once DoD acknowledges and embraces its role in public diplomacy, the remaining recommendations suggest areas for further examination to formalize the U.S. military's public diplomacy mission.

Chapter 3: Assessing the Military's Public Diplomacy Capacity

*We have no way of knowing exactly which of America's efforts or American images will prove influential. But the lesson of the Cold War is that we should use every tool we have.*³³

– James Fallows

Improving the military's public diplomacy capability must begin with a thorough appraisal of the military's PD requirements, needs and activities. However, gaining a more complete picture will require a detailed look below the national policy and decision-maker level and into the military's ground combat formations down to battalion level.

Bottom-up vice Top-down

Most recent public diplomacy studies have focused on identifying problems and recommending fixes for the national-level strategy, policy apparatus and broadcast capabilities. A review of any one of these studies will almost assuredly mention the need for an over-arching national level communications strategy, additional senior-level public diplomacy officials, new and/or improved interagency policy coordinating structures, increased national-level broadcast media capabilities, and additional funding.

The Defense Science Board's (DSB) report, Strategic Communications, published in September 2004, is one important example. Only two of the report's seven major recommendations directly addresses the military and then only at the most senior levels. The DSB's previous report on the subject, Managed Information Dissemination, published in October 2001, is similarly top-down focused although it does more directly address the military. Table 1 below is a side by side listing of the various recommendations made in these two DSB reports (see Appendices A & B for the complete recommendation list from each report). Neither report

focused or adequately addressed the role, capabilities and shortfalls of the military's ground forces with regard to public diplomacy.

#	Managed Information Dissemination Report Recommendations ^{*34}	Strategic Communications Report Recommendations ³⁵
1	Issue an "International Information Dissemination (IID)" National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)	Issue a "Strategic Communications" NSPD
2	Establish an National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on IID supported by an expanded DoS Secretariat	Establish a permanent strategic communications structure within the NSC; work with Congress to create a new advisor and a new committee
3	Strengthen U.S. IID by harnessing the Internet revolution to civilian and military capabilities	Fund and create a new, independent Strategic Communications "Center"
4	Secretary of State strengthen the DoS's International Information Bureau under the leadership of an assistant Secretary; substantially increase funding for Bureau activities intended to understand and influence foreign publics, with much of the increase for contracted products and services; make these assets available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives	Redefine, reorganize and expand DoS' Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
5	Secretary of Defense establish an International Public Information Committee within DoD under OASD (SO/LIC)	Elevate the status of public diplomacy directors within DoS and mandate public diplomacy experience for all Foreign-Service officers
6	Secretary of Defense implement DoD's draft OASD (SO/LIC) guidelines to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staff, • Revitalize the CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans, • Strengthen PYSOP capability to support the U.S. Government's strategic information programs, and • Effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat. 	Assign DoD's Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as DoD's Strategic Communications lead and create a new deputy assistant secretary to specifically handle DSPD
7	Secretary of Defense enhance DoD's information dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanded use of direct satellite FM radio and TV, • Additional use of regional magazines such as Forum and Dialogue, • Expanding use of regional Internet Web sites; and • Establishment of a public diplomacy office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 	Ensure all military plans and operations include Strategic Communications components coordinated across the interagency; Expand US STRATEGIC COMMAND (STRATCOM) and US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND's (SOCOM) IO responsibilities to include DSPD; Triple current resources (funding and personnel) available to the Regional Combatant Commanders for DSPD; Reallocate IO funding within STRATCOM for expanded support of strategic communications programs

Table 1

Just as with materiel acquisition, DoD (along with the rest of the government) has overly focused on public diplomacy's "high-end" or national level needs. In the acquisition arena, DoD routinely and understandably focused its attention and public discussion on high-end items like Comanche, the F-22, the Osprey and Crusader while paying less attention to the current status of low-end items like body armor, night vision goggles and small-arms optics. The outcry that followed the identification of drastic shortages of these low-cost items following the start of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom is still reverberating. Michael Moss, in a recent article on Operation Iraqi Freedom supply shortfalls, supports this notion. Moss said,

“Others say that the Pentagon's longstanding preference for billion-dollar weaponry has made it less prepared to deliver the basic tools needed by soldiers on the ground.”³⁶

Similarly, DoD (and perhaps the public diplomacy community itself) is overlooking public diplomacy's ground floor, too enamored with remodeling the penthouses within the White House, DoS and DoD. This is not to deny the validity or value of the DSB's work, but rather to suggest the need for an equally rigorous bottom-up review focused on how the world's most powerful military ground force could more effectively provide assistance to the nation's public diplomacy effort.

While the publication of another Presidential Directive or the creation of an additional Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense may prove necessary, the more immediate need is to provide public diplomacy experts at the ground force level. DoD should not predicate changes at the ground force level on accomplishing the national level recommendations in these two reports. Speaking in general about public diplomacy, Seyom Brown said, “The United States must reshape its image abroad by crafting public diplomacy efforts that are effective at the local level.”³⁷ The U.S. military is currently well positioned across the globe to help begin that reshaping process.

Recommendation 2: DoD should undertake a detailed, bottom-up review of the military's current public diplomacy needs and capabilities.

*DoD in a detailed bottom-up review should identify shortfalls that limit the ability of ground force commanders, especially at the Brigade and Battalion level, to most effectively influence the host nation constituencies residing outside the gates of their forward operating bases.*³⁸

The review should be structured to:

- ✓ Categorize (PD vs. DSPD) and catalog existing military public diplomacy activities (to include activities in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, other contingencies and the various Regional Combatant Command areas of responsibility)
- ✓ Discern the true public diplomacy capability needs (both personnel and equipment) of deployed ground force commanders
- ✓ Assess the potential for transforming existing surrogate public diplomacy force structure (PA, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, and Foreign Area Officers) into a permanent public diplomacy career field
- ✓ Match existing capabilities with existing requirements
- ✓ Determine the resulting shortfalls
- ✓ Recommend appropriate force structure, doctrinal and training base changes to correct identified shortfalls

Recommendation 3: The Secretary of Defense should designate a DoD and Service lead for public diplomacy

The Secretary of Defense should immediately designate a lead for public diplomacy. Following the combined recommendations of the Defense Science Board's Strategic Communications and Managed Information Dissemination reports would be prudent. In addition, the Secretary should designate from among the ground services (Army or Marine Corps) a PD lead to develop the requisite force structure (personnel and equipment), training and doctrine.

Chapter 4: Toward Establishing a Public Diplomacy Capability

“DoD public diplomacy is comprised of strategic actions such as deployment of troops and ships for combined training or demonstration of resolve, official visits, and defense and military contacts with foreign officials. However, there is no one within DoD specifically tasked to plan or conduct PD activities even though DoD possesses enormous potential to influence foreign audiences through an organized and coordinated PD program.”³⁹

- Defense Science Board

Recalling that two of the basic principles of war and operations are “Unity of Command” and “Unity of Effort,” as regards public diplomacy, the military has achieved neither.⁴⁰ To establish a true capability, DoD must either assign public diplomacy as a core-task for an existing discipline or develop and man a new stand alone discipline.


The Advisory Nature of the Staff

Advisors are a vital and necessary component of any staff. Military headquarters are full of staff officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and junior enlisted members specializing in various functional areas. Their singular role is to “help the commander make and implement decisions”.⁴¹ They assist the ground force commander in planning, coordinating and executing the maneuver task force’s assigned tasks.

Fire support, engineer, intelligence and logistics specialists play a significant and tangible role in advising and assisting their commanders in the coordination and synchronization of the battlefield. While these staff entities figure directly in the armed conflict, there are others whose role, while not a part of the traditional “battlefield calculus,” represent a vital capability in support of their organizations and commanders. The unit Chaplain, Staff Judge Advocate and Public Affairs specialists each provide commanders with critical advice and guidance in their respective areas of expertise.

No such staff officer, NCO or specialist exists to advise the commander on public diplomacy matters. What exists instead is a composite of specialists trained in areas tangential to public diplomacy and each endeavoring to help fill this gap.

A Diffused Capability



The military's existing public diplomacy capability is diffused across a wide array of military specialties, functional areas and disciplines. At the ground force level (distinct from the strategic communications model), legitimate arguments can be made that aspects

Figure 2
of public diplomacy are present in the Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP and Foreign Area Officer career fields, as well as in the actions of Commanders themselves (see Figure 2).

However, while individuals in each of these career fields dabble in public diplomacy, none can be considered a bonafide expert. Additionally, since each is busy (and most comfortable) with those tasks for which he or she has been trained, their true public diplomacy capability is at best, incomplete. Further, because public diplomacy has not been established as a core task for any of them, none has been given the lead and none is trained or prepared to execute the task to any particular standard.⁴²

Thus the military finds itself executing PD activities without any organic expertise in the field. Instead it has become reliant upon dual-hatted specialists, "sub-contracted" from existing disciplines. The result is a relatively weak capability diffused among a variety of specialties with

no one at the helm. Ground force commanders below the Joint Task Force-level, that is to say those without a resident State Department representative, have no single expert to whom they can turn for reliable and quality public diplomacy counsel.

In the absence of such counsel, commanders have had to rely upon staff surrogates as well as their own personal experience and gut instinct in the execution of their public diplomacy responsibilities. While it may be argued that many commanders and units have nonetheless been moderately successful in engaging their local host-nation constituencies, the addition of an organic capability would have assured consistency and greater success across the force. (Appendix C provides a case study that demonstrates how one unit organized itself during Operation Iraqi Freedom in an attempt to reach out to the local population.)

Lanes in the Road and the Internal Struggle for Primacy

As discussed previously, DoD considers Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and PSYOP as distinct communication components within its strategic communications rubric. While it acknowledges that each is vital, it has chosen only to field two of them, PSYOP and PA, as bonafide military specialties. It has neither acknowledged PD as a military specialty nor assigned that responsibility to any other existing branch or specialty.⁴³

Perhaps the real impasse for DoD stems from the significant tension that currently exists between the military's two established communications disciplines -- PSYOP and PA. Each has become firmly entrenched in its belief that the other is ill-suited for public diplomacy, though at the same time failing to lay out a specific way ahead for its own assumption of the task.

This inter-discipline squabble has become increasingly problematic – so much so that the 101st Airborne Division cited it in its after action review following operations in and around the city of Mosul, Iraq. The review states that, “The public affairs office was hampered by doctrine

and their perceived journalistic credibility. Although Public Affairs Officers churned out photographs and printed news articles on coalition efforts in helping the local population and coalition actions, these articles were not included in the division-produced local Arabic newspaper because the newspaper was produced by a PSYOP unit. It was stated that doing so would cause Army Public Affairs to lose credibility because public affairs is only meant to inform, not to influence. PSYOP forces were hampered by their lack of assets, training, and support as well as the perception of "PSYOP".⁴⁴

The bottleneck is most dramatically evidenced by the lack of progress in assigning primacy for public diplomacy following the initial steps put forth in the Information Operations (IO) Roadmap. The Roadmap was undertaken in part to begin the process of identifying roles and responsibilities for public diplomacy, public affairs and PSYOP. The Roadmap's own Appendix C attempted to delineate specific responsibilities for the variety of tasks envisioned in the body of the report. In an e-mail describing this appendix, Tom Timmes, a consultant to the Pentagon's Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Counter-Terrorism's PSYOP Policy Division wrote, "It looks at PSYOP, PA, and DSPD and broadly identifies those commonly accepted responsibilities for each discipline. However, it isn't the last word and generated some controversy. During the development of the IO Roadmap, a senior rep from our office met repeatedly with OASD(PA) [the Pentagon's Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs] to attempt to develop 'lanes in the road.' Despite the many meetings and papers that were generated, only a broad consensus was reached. Furthermore, as part of the year-long follow-on IO Roadmap Implementation phase, a group was formed that met regularly to identify the lanes. This attempt, to my knowledge, did not generate any changes to Appendix C."⁴⁵

The PSYOP community argues that because military Public Affairs is almost exclusively focused on 'informing' the domestic audience about military activities, they are of little value in the PD arena. In fact, a review of existing PA doctrine and schoolhouse programs of instruction quickly validates this assertion. In a Washington Times article, Richard Halloran further notes that while PD has languished in the State Department, DoD "has focused on U.S. press and television".⁴⁶

The PSYOP community has a strong argument. While the military should and indeed must communicate to the domestic audience, there is a far greater risk to the force and to the success of its operations on the ground when it fails to communicate to the foreign audience on whose soil it operates. Lack of support from the domestic media and the American public will likely manifest itself in negative polling data, editorials, opinion pieces, and across the Sunday-morning talk show circuit. If strong enough, it may even prompt Congressional hearings that, in time, may reverse a policy. However, lack of domestic support is not likely to result in the death of a U.S. Soldier or foreign citizen.

Conversely, the failure to effectively communicate with and convince foreign publics about the necessity of specific U.S. policies and actions creates a more dangerous environment as witnessed daily in Iraq. Given the extreme disparity in the seriousness of the risks involved, it would make a lot more sense to focus available military communications activities, to include PA, on the foreign audience.

PSYOP specialists further argue that because PA personnel are not trained to understand the cultural values, history and language of the foreign audiences they seek to inform, they are ill-prepared to assume responsibility for PD. Most public diplomacy experts agree that a firm understanding in these areas is essential for effective public diplomacy. Former U.S.

Ambassador to Ethiopia and current professor of political science at George Washington University, David Shinn, remarked in a recent speech, "Grass-roots public diplomacy using personnel who know the issues, region and perhaps the local language will be more effective in making [America's] case. This again puts a premium on more language and area training for public diplomacy personnel."⁴⁷

More than their PSYOP counterparts, the PA community believes it is possible to make a clear distinction between efforts to inform and efforts to influence.⁴⁸ Conceptually, as described by members of the Pentagon's PSYOP Policy community, PD exists along an information continuum and is defined by the objective of its

The Information Continuum




Figure 3

message and the size of its intended audience. According to this model, PD activities lie somewhere between those of PA, which seek to inform a very broad audience; and PSYOP, which endeavors to modify the behavior of a very narrow audience (see Figure 3).⁴⁹ The unvarnished truth that seems to escape PA purists (as well as their counterparts with the Broadcasting Board of Governors) is that it is impossible to merely inform an audience in an environment in which the opposition immediately counters any statement of fact with distortions intended to denigrate and impugn every U.S. action. PSYOP specialists argue that this philosophical uneasiness with influencing an audience makes PA ill-suited to public diplomacy.

Equally compelling is the PA community's argument that the military's ability to maintain credibility with the public (both foreign and domestic) is paramount. According to this argument,

the inherent danger in the PSYOP community engaging in PD is the possibility of the message being poisoned by a public perception that it is simply propaganda or disinformation. The PA community's argument receives support from Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale in an article written for the Heritage Foundation where they state that, "The U.S. should continue its public diplomacy by promoting positive relations between foreign publics and U.S. soldiers on deployments by coordinating their efforts with U.S. embassy public diplomacy personnel. Information warfare and PSYOP, however, should remain a separate endeavor intended primarily to support combat operations to avoid damaging the credibility of other activities."⁵⁰

The National Defense University (NDU) also questions the use of PSYOP in a public diplomacy role. A 2004 NDU draft report entitled, "Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience" addresses what it terms "mission confusion". It states: "Among the many informal and formal lessons learned offered about PSYOP, many raise questions of whether PSYOP is properly focused on its priority mission. In general it is alleged that PSYOP missions have been construed too broadly with negative effects. PSYOP needs to be coordinated with public diplomacy and public affairs efforts to avoid conflicting and/or dissipated effects. PSYOP doctrine and mission statements that could easily be confused with mandates to conduct public diplomacy and public affairs do not seem helpful. The broader Special Operations community clearly defines its primary missions, and clearly distinguishes between primary and collateral missions. We conclude that PSYOP would be well advised to do the same."⁵¹

So concerned over the possible negative impact of information operations on the military's credibility, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed and released CM-2077-04 in September 2004 to serve as a policy firebreak to restrict the interaction between

the PSYOP/IO and PA communities.⁵² This policy, when coupled with the existing statutory ban on the domestic use of military PSYOP embodied in Smith-Mundt⁵³; the public perception (or misperception) of PSYOP as a “black art;” and the PSYOP community’s own desire to re-focus itself on tactical PSYOP as indicated in the NDU report, clearly undermines any legitimate role for PSYOP in a PD role.⁵⁴

Field the Missing Communications Specialty

As pointed out earlier, ground forces are not currently resourced with sufficient capabilities with which to mount and sustain a deliberate public diplomacy campaign. Though commanders fully realize the value and need for such efforts, they are forced to cobble together ad hoc elements that are neither trained for nor capable of such an effort. Further, when the need arises for the use of those very same assets in the activities for which they were originally intended and designed, commanders, forced to choose between these competing priorities, typically choose the latter leaving the PD effort to languish.

The conclusion of this analysis is that none of the existing military career fields are best suited for the job of public diplomacy. Shortcomings within the PA and PSYOP communities have been sufficiently explored above. Civil Affairs personnel, while trained in foreign languages and cultures, are not trained as communicators. The Foreign Area Officer Corps while also regionally and linguistically competent, exist to support U.S. diplomats but not in sufficient numbers to meet the needs of ground warfighters. Nonetheless, each of the aforementioned disciplines should help inform military force developers in the identification of the specific expertise necessary in a PD specialist.

What is required is a cadre of military personnel that are regionally focused, trained in the cultures and major languages of their regions and dedicated to public diplomacy as their core

competency. Such a cadre of military members would provide ground force commanders with a much needed capability to mount and sustain a deliberate public diplomacy campaign aimed at the foreign audience immediately outside their own Forward Operating Bases. Rather than allowing inaction and an internal struggle to prevent the development and employment of this necessary capability, DoD should take purposeful steps to begin making improvements in its ability to win “hearts and minds”.

As Jack Spencer opined, DoD must continuously think through and establish priorities for America’s Armed Forces by focusing its resources on combat capabilities, which the authors believe includes public diplomacy. Spencer notes that, “The Pentagon should identify those assets that are old, obsolete, and inappropriate in the modern world and reinvest those funds in assets that have been in short supply in recent years,”⁵⁵ a concept that the Army has termed “re-balancing the force”. Focused primarily on existing capabilities, DoD must closely examine how, and indeed if, they are being used and then determine which assets can be permanently re-tasked in order to meet the higher priority PD need.

Recommendation 4: DoD should establish a public diplomacy career field.

The military should establish a public diplomacy career field with the goal of providing a true PD capability down to the Battalion Task Force level. Notwithstanding Congressional desire for broad-based improvement in cultural awareness and language proficiency across the military, the mechanics and resources necessary to implement a military-wide improvement in cultural understanding and language capability would be daunting. The development of a PD capability would provide a targeted and more efficient way to begin to get at these much needed reforms.

Such specialists would serve as staff advisors to their commanders, instructors to the unit’s Soldiers and junior leaders, and as the chief architect/overseers for the unit’s local public

diplomacy efforts. The public diplomacy elements at each echelon should be vertically and horizontally linked to ensure consistency of message, share information and interpret results. Linkage should continue up through the appropriate Regional Combatant Command level, which itself would be tied into the national-level PD architecture. At the most senior military levels, these elements should interface directly with the State Department Political Advisors (POLADs) already serving within our Regional Combatant Commands, Combined Joint Task Forces, and, in the case of Iraq, as far down as Division level.

In conjunction with the Services and Department of State (DoS), DoD should identify the best "source(s)" from which to build this public diplomacy corps. A variety of viable options exist that could provide the necessary capability without unduly growing either the military or DoS. Such options include the creation of a specific public diplomacy military occupation specialty (MOS) within the Civil Affairs, Public Affairs or PSYOP disciplines; establishment of an entirely new public diplomacy branch; or creation of a combined public diplomacy capability composed of both military and civilian specialists. It is beyond the scope of this report to provide a definitive manning concept, but rather to suggest the concept to those already engaged in the development of the future force structure.

The U.S. Army's current transformation concept of "rebalancing the force" should serve as a model for how to proceed. The Army is attempting to divest itself of unneeded, low priority and/or excess capabilities in order to fill higher priority requirements without significantly altering its current end strength. In describing this effort, Sergeant Major of the Army, Kenneth Preston stated, "We have a lot of troops in 'Cold War' jobs. I call these 'high density low demand' fields. The Army is going to rebalance those people to 'high demand low density fields like military police and civil affairs. Somewhere between 100,000 and 115,000 Soldiers will

transform to new positions."⁵⁶ The newly appointed Secretary of the Army, Dr. Francis Harvey, has gone further by outlining additional methods whereby his Service could "free up resources for the Army's primary missions." Among these methods is the use of "outsourcing where it makes sense."⁵⁷

One possible course of action for populating a military PD corps would be to "rebalance" from across the entire military's existing 'high density, low demand' career fields as well as civilianizing other selected military positions. For example, the role of the military's Public Affairs specialists could be transformed into one of Public Diplomacy. The active-duty Army alone maintains over 900 PA specialists among its officer and enlisted ranks.⁵⁸ The majority, if not all, of the domestic functions of the current PA force could be civilianized – freeing up hundreds of active and reserve component billets. In addition, the PA force structure (people and equipment) currently employed in the broadcast journalism realm and running the overseas Armed Forces Network service is anachronistic and no longer necessary in today's satellite broadcast world. These billets too could be rebalanced as PD specialists. This course of action would have the added benefit of matching DoD's organizational structure with that of the State Department which has already placed both disciplines beneath its Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

The development and fielding of a public diplomacy corps will clearly require trade-offs from among existing capabilities as well as other new and competing requirements. In addition, the size, composition and equipment requirements at each echelon; resourcing service and military component (active vs reserve); peacetime, training, and wartime command and support relationships; as well as PD professional development and career paths for these new specialists

would all need to be addressed. However, the military should not shy away from this task if the result of its bottom up review validates the need for such a capability.

Chapter 5: Training the Military in Public Diplomacy

"In the military arena, only a select few service men and women are sent to school to receive intensive language and cultural training. While I am not suggesting that every service member who is assigned to serve in the Middle East must be fluent in Arabic, I think we must do a better job to prepare our forces for the cultural differences they will undoubtedly encounter."⁵⁹

- Congressman Ike Skelton

Hoping to prevent the sort of postwar chaos that engulfed Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld's office believes that in the future units' readiness for war should be judged not only by traditional standards, such as how accurately they shoot a target, but also by the number of foreign language speakers in their ranks, their awareness of the local culture where they will fight, and their ability to train and equip local security forces. Staged convoy ambushes and meetings with individuals playing the role of Iraqi leaders are becoming more common within Army units preparing to deploy.⁶⁰ However, a capability gap will still remain without specific training geared towards the conduct of public diplomacy.

Specific public diplomacy instruction is glaringly absent from the formal training programs of the military's pseudo-public diplomacy specialists – that is PSYOP, PA, and Civil Affairs. For example, the Public Affairs Officer Qualification Course, used to train all U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corp public affairs officers, only requires students to know the distinctions and relationships among public affairs, public diplomacy, propaganda, information, and psychological operations. The Army's civil affairs officers, though trained in the culture and language of their specific world region are focused primarily on how to restore civil resources and civil governance, but similarly lack formal training in public diplomacy.⁶¹ PSYOP specialists receive the same cultural and linguistic training as their civil affairs counterparts as well as formal training in developing and communicating specific themes and messages aimed at a target audience. Based on their training PSYOP specialists are best prepared to fill the role of

public diplomacy specialist. However, they also do not receive specific public diplomacy training. Without such specific training, the well intentioned U.S. military unit may unintentionally communicate messages or information that is off target, misinterpreted, or even antagonizing.

The military routinely trains itself through formalized courses and field exercises. The Pinnacle Course, a joint course that helps prepare senior leaders to serve as joint/combined force commanders, has students analyze the impact of strategic communications and information operations on unity of effort and the achievement of national objectives.⁶² There are also efforts to add a new course on the impact of culture on military operations for mid-career officers at the Army's Command and General Staff College.⁶³ These are all positive and useful developments necessary to the military's ability to better communicate in the regions in which they serve.

The State Department's Foreign Service Institute in Washington, D.C. offers a 19-week public diplomacy training regimen. The training courses are designed to be taken some time during an individual's first three Department of State assignments. There are three course tracks: a one week Public Diplomacy Basics Track, an eight week Cultural Affairs Track, and an eight week Information Officer Track. The one week Basics Track provides familiarization, orientation, and an introduction to public diplomacy.⁶⁴ The military's Joint Information Operations Center has thus far sent 12 field grade officers through three days of the Basic Track.⁶⁵ One objective of their three days of training was to understand how the State Department thinks and works in terms of informing, engaging, and influencing. An additional objective was to determine how Information Operations personnel may better support and coordinate with the Department of State's public diplomacy personnel. This is further evidence that the U.S. government and military recognizes the need for improvement in this critical area.

While role playing and cultural familiarization courses should continue and expand for every American Soldier, “Not to make him a linguist, but to make him a diplomat in uniform”,⁶⁶ the conduct of public diplomacy requires expertise in understanding human factors and the intricacies of complex societies. Thus, the military should establish a true public diplomacy training regimen that will help equip an officially established public diplomacy cadre, tie together the military’s many diffused efforts into a more refined and deliberate public diplomacy approach, and tie together efforts from the strategic to the tactical level.

Recommendation 5: DoD should develop a public diplomacy program of instruction.

DoD should direct the development of a program of instruction for public diplomacy specialists (knowledge and performance competency) as well as for military leaders and service members (familiarization). Using existing State Department lesson plans; operational lessons learned; and DoD's existing language, cultural, and communications training programs; an effective public diplomacy program of instruction can and should be developed.

The military public diplomacy practitioner must fully understand the nature of the target society and the environment in which they operate. Key elements of this understanding might include, but are not limited to:

- *Culture, religion, ethnicity, and politics of the target region*
- *Relationship and linkage between the populace and the government*
- *Linguistics and literacy rates*
- *Identification and nature of the influential elites*
- *Macro and micro economic structure*
- *Role of the media in the region*

- *Role of intellectuals and universities in the region*
- *Physical means of information dissemination (radio, television, INTERNET, newspaper, word of mouth, etc)*
- *Relationship between the pertinent national/sub-national/trans-national elements*

Chapter 6: Public Diplomacy Doctrine

“...meeting the challenges of this rapidly changing world depends on our understanding and applying our doctrine.”⁶⁷

- John P. Jumper, General USAF, Chief of Staff

A review of existing military doctrine⁶⁸ reveals a lack of discussion with regard to public diplomacy. Since contact between the military and the local populations overseas is unavoidable, there is a clear need for formal public diplomacy doctrine to ensure it is done right.

Doctrine consists of the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives.⁶⁹ Operationally and forward deployed military forces conduct public diplomacy every day – even though they have neither been trained to do so, nor resourced with the necessary doctrine. Because of this reality, military doctrine needs to address how the Soldier, Seaman, Airman and Marine are to conduct public diplomacy. Doctrine should specifically address the conduct of public diplomacy from strategic through tactical levels. At a minimum, doctrine should recognize and specifically address how military practitioners should:

- At the strategic level, work with key interagency players to develop, coordinate and implement the USG’s pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict public diplomacy campaign
- At the operational level, develop, coordinate and implement regional and/or country-specific public diplomacy efforts with selected State Department officials; associated coalition/alliance nations and entities; host nations; relevant non-government organizations; as well as local, regional, international and domestic media
- At the tactical level, orchestrate local public diplomacy efforts in coordination with assigned/attached Civil Affairs and Public Affairs personnel, key local leaders, the local population, and local media

At the strategic and operational level, joint military doctrine is fairly sufficient in advocating for the consideration and inclusion of other U.S. government agencies, allied, host nation and non-governmental entities within the planning and conduct of military operations. However, all levels need to be tied together so that there is a consistent public diplomacy message, methodology and goal. The current doctrine for joint operations states that guidance from civilian and military policymakers is a prerequisite for developing a military campaign plan; military campaigns are not conducted in isolation of other government efforts to achieve national strategic objectives;⁷⁰ commanders and joint force planners are to consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective; and because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, national military strategy, and the desired outcome.⁷¹

It is critical through all phases of operations, though especially during the post-conflict phase, that military public diplomacy efforts are executed in accordance with an established methodology that is consistent at the strategic, operational and tactical-levels. A continued ad hoc approach to military public diplomacy efforts, especially at the tactical and operational levels unnecessarily places the national-strategic effort at risk.

Recommendation 6: DoD should develop and promulgate public diplomacy doctrine.

In concert with DoS and experts in the field, DoD should develop, publish, and promulgate public diplomacy doctrine, focused primarily on the tactics, techniques and procedures that will serve as a "how to" guide for the forces in the field from the strategic to tactical level.

Chapter 7: Measures of Effectiveness

"A new culture of measurement must be established within all public diplomacy structures." ⁷²

A common recommendation found in almost every recent study on public diplomacy is the need for establishing measures of effectiveness. Most recently the Defense Science Board noted in its 2004 study that "Critical to the success of a new strategic communications effort will be creating a culture of measurement that helps the U.S. make necessary adjustments and learn from both past and present efforts and initiatives. This feedback loop must continually foster accountability and measure success against selected objectives—looping up to the highest levels of the new communication function."⁷³ Lacking in the Defense Science Board's report and, indeed in each of the studies, is any specific recommendation on how to do a reliable measurement against a subjective and soft issue such as public diplomacy which would seem to rely more on the quality of the effort than on the quantity.

One need look no further than the military's public diplomacy efforts abroad to note that there is not an established method for gathering data to measure the effectiveness of their actions. An examination of several military After Action Reviews (AAR's) reveals a sense of frustration over the lack of training and resources invested in public diplomacy efforts, but puts particular emphasis on the fact that lack of any relevant metrics hampered such work. For example, the 101st Assault Division Strike Brigade Information Operations After Action Review of 22 January 2002 notes that, "Had more effort been placed on conducting surveys and opinion polls, we could have better directed our messages toward specific portions of the population and better understood the issues."⁷⁴

Indeed, there are no established measures of effectiveness immediately evident for the larger public diplomacy community either. A logical starting point would be strategic goals with

identified measures of effectiveness that could then be used throughout the public diplomacy community. We can see an embryonic effort in the Office of Management and Budget's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). The Departments of State and Defense, along with the rest of the government, are already obligated to use PART in order to comply with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). The GPRA requires federal agencies to identify their long-term and annual goals, collect performance data, and justify budget requests based on the data. The PART is fairly new and it is generally acknowledged to be far from perfect but it is an important step in providing a common methodology for federal programs to explicitly identify measures and goals for judging performance. The PART proceeds through four critical areas of assessment—purpose and design, strategic planning, management, and results and accountability.⁷⁵

Having said that and agreed that the PART has the potential to be an important component of measuring effectiveness, it is not logical to expect the military to wait indefinitely for the PART to reach maturity before determining valid measures of its own. Military commanders need tools to access current information on public diplomacy goals but also to allow them access to a shared data base to both understand what has been effective for other units and to provide feedback on what they themselves find to be most effective. The State Department's Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources is considering something described as "PD in a box." This would provide training for the military, beginning at the Component Command level and to whatever level each command chooses, but could also provide the access to goals and the tools described above. An interactive website where such information could be found and kept easily up to date would seem to be the most useful method although one needs to be conscious of creating a non-web dependent resource for use in the field when computer access might be unavailable.

Lacking strategic goals and while waiting for State to test out its “PD in a box” concept, the Department of Defense can and should begin to better define measures of effectiveness for its public diplomacy efforts. As training and performance standards are developed for military public diplomacy, so should the metrics to measure against these standards for training and performance. In addition, the military should look to experts in the private community to help with further defining measures. The DSB report on Strategic Communications recommends that, “Cutting edge private sector measurements, models and management systems, both qualitative and quantitative should be applied to calibrate progress...”⁷⁶ Tapping such expertise could help establish discussion or focus groups or conduct the surveys mentioned in the military’s own AAR’s. Adding tools such as some type of interactive data-base exchange would help spread knowledge and understanding both vertically and horizontally to begin to build necessary measures of effectiveness.

Recommendation 7: DoD should develop clear measures of effectiveness.

DoD should develop clear measures of effectiveness against the training and performance objectives of a new public diplomacy specialty; tap private community experts to help further define measures; and develop an inter-active data base for vertical and horizontal sharing of measures of effectiveness.

Chapter 8: Making the Case

*"The Defense Department "has not yet embraced stabilization and reconstruction operations as an explicit mission with the same seriousness as combat operations," according to the study. "This mind-set must be changed." Nation-building capabilities "should become a major driver for the future force," according to the report, including training soldiers to interact with a local population and achieving a working understanding of foreign cultures. "We need to treat learning knowledge of culture and developing language skills as seriously as we treat learning combat skills: both are needed for success in achieving U.S. political and military objectives," the report states. "*⁷⁷

– Boston Globe, 5 Jan 2005 (reporting on DSB 2004 Summer Study on "Transition to and from Hostilities")

Gaining the support or at least tacit approval of the local population is a crucial component of shaping the battlefield as well as assuring freedom of maneuver. A direct military public diplomacy capability, if properly developed, would not only foster local civilian cooperation in support of U.S. military forces, but also greatly improve DoD's ability to meet its interagency responsibilities in the overall PD effort.

It is clear however, that any effort to enhance the military's public diplomacy capability invites criticism from some within the military as well those who already view the military through jaundiced eyes. While some may argue against a direct military role in public diplomacy, the reality of today's battlefield, global information environment, and the nature of America's enemies necessitates the inclusion of public diplomacy in a new battlefield calculus.

The Military Case

As discussed early in this report, military commanders, especially those charged with the responsibilities of ground combat, are hesitant to add to their already burdensome list of tasks. Many would likely view the vagaries of public diplomacy as something better done by someone else as it would compete for already limited resources. Perhaps the military critics' most cogent argument is the overextension of limited resources especially as the military's role continues to

expand amidst the increased complexity of today's operational environment. Acknowledging limited resources, the authors argue specifically for the provision of a trained PD cadre as a way to help ground force commanders address that complex environment. The fact is direct face to face interaction between the military and the local population is unavoidable. A trained PD cadre will greatly enhance the commander's ability to protect the force and the civilians in his/her area and increase that population's knowledge, trust and confidence in the U.S. military.

Unavoidable Military Involvement in Public Diplomacy

It is worth repeating that interaction between members of the U.S. military and the local population is an inevitable reality. These daily and direct actions, whether cooperative or confrontational, are indeed the most basic form of public diplomacy. Depending on the approach, the military will either benefit from this interaction or assume an exponentially greater risk to its Soldiers.

Most foreign nationals, like most Americans, are apt to base their opinions on personal experiences rather than on the multi-media cacophony of thoughts and ideas with which they are barraged – whether in the form of print media, broadcast media or rumor. The vignette below, based on the experience of one of the authors, helps to illustrate this point:

*Following the Coalition Provisional Authority's establishment of a formal "Weapons Policy" in Iraq, which stipulated the number and type of privately owned weapons an Iraqi family could maintain at home, Coalition Forces conducted a series of door-to-door searches for contraband weapons. The 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division was among the many units in Baghdad tasked with conducting these searches. During the conduct of these searches, the brigade's Paratroopers spoke to literally thousands of Iraqi citizens, including men, women and children. One Iraqi woman, in particular, questioned why we weren't doing more to counter claims made by the enemy over satellite and radio broadcasts that Coalition Forces were raping and stealing from Iraqis. She continued, saying 'We watch and see you everyday. You do not do these things.'*⁷⁸

Hence, if ground force commanders at the brigade and battalion-level are resourced with a public diplomacy capability that does not rely on Soldiers trained and intended for an entirely different purpose, the commanders will be better able to initiate a dialogue with the citizens in their areas of responsibility and garner their support.

Force Protection at the Crossroads

Operationally deployed forces, like those currently in Iraq, exist at the nexus between U.S. rhetoric, policy and actions. Incongruence, whether real or contrived, between the government's words, policies and actions automatically generates an additional element of risk to the Soldier on the ground. The inability to quickly and effectively address those concerns with the local population serves only to lend credence to the terrorists' message.

In a statement made in August 1996, Osama bin Laden sought to rally Muslim world sentiment against the U.S. and the West by emphasizing the perceived disconnect between U.S. "words" on human rights and "actions" in terms of its support for Israel. Bin Laden stated, "The people of Islam awakened and realized that they are the main target for the aggression of the Zionist-Crusaders alliance. All false claims and propaganda about "Human Rights" were hammered down and exposed by the massacres that took place against the Muslims in every part of the world." ⁷⁹ Bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and others continue to justify actions against U.S. and Coalition Forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as recruit others to their terrorist networks using U.S. hypocrisy as their *raison d'être*.

Thus, military forces deployed to countries in which America's adversaries use these seeming disconnects to foment unrest, advocate violence against Americans, and recruit members are at the greatest risk simply because of their proximity to the problem. By extension then, the U.S. military has a vested interest in public diplomacy if for no other reason than force protection.

As discussed previously, U.S. military forces on the ground are uniquely positioned to immediately, directly, and vehemently counter an adversary's false claims and allegations with the very audiences the terrorists themselves are trying to sway. Mounting a deliberate and sustained local public diplomacy effort would allow military commanders to directly dispel much of the rhetoric spewed by America's adversaries and develop an increased level of trust among the local population. This in turn would likely lead to an increase in actionable intelligence brought forward by local citizens whose trust and confidence in the U.S. military would have been raised by the willingness of local commanders to engage with them in a deliberate dialogue. Thus public diplomacy can and should be considered integral to any force protection plan.

Face-to-Face Communications

As a technique for effective communications, psychology experts have demonstrated that face to face is the best method for promoting new ideas. In an article entitled, "Face to Face matters," author Jack Pyle argues, "Decades of behavioral science research support the importance of face-to-face communication and the significance of word-of-mouth in influencing people to change their minds and their behaviors. The evidence has been around for 50 years. And still, organizations—even some of the most sophisticated organizations—place little emphasis on face-to-face communication."⁸⁰

Understandably then, many public diplomacy experts believe that the best way to conduct public diplomacy is through face-to-face communications. In an online book review of the newly released book, Engaging the Arab and Islamic Worlds through Public Diplomacy, Adam Powell quotes the book's editor and former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates, William A. Rugh, in saying, "Face to face contacts are especially important."⁸¹

In his book Soft Power, Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and former dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, discusses public diplomacy in depth. In his discussion of the various means of affecting public diplomacy, Nye also makes clear that "face-to-face communications remain the most effective."⁸²

Given the value placed on this type of communication by psychology and public diplomacy experts, there is no U.S. entity better postured to engage in direct face-to-face public diplomacy than its military. In terms of gross numbers, the graph below depicts general overseas military strength since 1966.

US Active Component Military Personnel Overseas, Stationed & Deployed						
	1966-1971	1980s	1990-1991	1992-1995	1996-2002	2003-2004
Total US Active Military Personnel (average)	3 million	2.125 m	2.05 m	1.66 m	1.408 m	1.426 m
Personnel Overseas (average)	1 million	516,000	555,000	283,000	246,800	383,000
% in overseas military operations	15	0.3	7.3	1.7	3	14
% overseas but not in mil ops	18	24	19.7	15.3	14.5	13

Figure 2⁸³

As of 6 January 2005, the U.S. military had over 160,000 Servicemen and women on the ground in Iraq and Kuwait, 17,000 in Afghanistan, 1,800 in the Horn of Africa, 680 in the Sinai, 200 in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and another 3,500 split between Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo and Macedonia.⁸⁴ This is not to mention the thousands forward-based in Europe, South Korea, Okinawa and elsewhere around the globe. Compare the military presence in any of these locations to the number of State Department Foreign-Service officers and diplomats in even the most robust embassy and the numbers don't even come close. Compare further the presence of private American citizens or businessmen, especially in the world's troubled regions, and the picture is similarly unimpressive.

There is a growing realization by the Bush Administration and among senior military leaders that Soldiers on the ground can serve as a powerful voice for American foreign policy especially in those troubled regions. While much has been written about the growing diplomatic role of the Regional Combatant Commanders,⁸⁵ more and more stories are appearing that attest to the positive impact of the average Soldier on the opinion of the local foreign populace.⁸⁶ Simple Soldier-civilian interaction overseas is the very essence of military public diplomacy. Not unlike the “beat cop” whose daily presence and interaction with the public fosters a strong bond and relationship with them, military forces that are able to communicate and understand the local populace are more apt to engender good feelings and cooperation. However, while units now destined for Iraq or Afghanistan may have sufficient time to prepare themselves, at least to some level of competence on the local culture and language, the very nature of the U.S. military demands that this capability be ready to go at the outset of hostilities. The need for a standing capability is palpable.

Looking to the future, the feasibility and likelihood that the State Department’s “deployable” public diplomacy capability will grow appreciably in size is low - especially given current fiscal realities. Similarly, the likelihood that a substantial number of private American citizens and/or businessmen will venture into crisis areas to help “promote” U.S. values, however desirable, is unrealistic. Conversely, the U.S. military’s overseas presence will likely remain quite high, especially in these same crisis areas.

DoD as “The Blob”

In an article entitled “American Gothic,” posted to the online journal MotherJones.com, author Tom Englehardt writes that, “The Pentagon is increasingly like that famed creation of 1950s sci-fi, the Blob; an alien life form capable of absorbing anything that crosses its path. It

has swallowed, for instance, many of the functions of the State Department and, having divided the globe into 5 commands (the latest being -- gulp -- Northcom, which means us) and with the heavens tossed in as well (Spacecom), its top commanders now travel the world like planetary plenipotentiaries.”⁸⁷ While Mr. Englehardt is perhaps a bit excessive in his description of what he terms “U.S. militarism,” it does seem to echo the sentiments of those who are concerned with the State Department losing its leading role in public diplomacy.

The authors firmly believe that the USG lead for public diplomacy should continue to reside in DoS. Further, the authors readily stipulated support for the many recommendations already made for fixes in the State Department’s own PD effort. Our purpose is simply to urge the military to take a more comprehensive role in public diplomacy, mostly by making itself more effective at what it is already doing.

Lack of Credibility

Another legitimate critique of military PD is that any attempt to engage the local populace could be undercut by the simultaneous use of violence within those same communities. Though a genuine concern, it is not necessarily insurmountable. Rather than view it as an argument against military public diplomacy, it should instead be used to inform military planners in the development of a full and forthright public diplomacy campaign. As former USIA director Edward R. Murrow has been often quoted, “public diplomacy must be present at the take-offs and not just the crash landings.”⁸⁸ This same thought process is applicable to military operations especially those that take place in and amongst a large civilian population center.

There is always the potential for both civilian casualties and collateral damage on the battlefield. Developing a close rapport with the local population in advance could help to prepare them for these often unavoidable tragedies and mitigate their severity. Through

deliberate PD efforts, local commanders will be better able to explain the need for selected military activities, provide advance notice when possible, and promulgate guidelines to the local population on how they should respond to military activities in their communities.

While there are likely other legitimate arguments against a greater military role in public diplomacy not raised in this report, none should prevent further exploration of these proposals. Fully and fairly investigating any and all options to enhance the military's ability to communicate with local foreign audiences seems to be a useful and prudent endeavor.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Since 9/11 many articles have been written, studies undertaken and recommendations made in an effort to repair America's hemorrhaging PD capabilities. While implementation of some of the recommendations has begun, at least in some modest ways, most remain just words in a report or within the pages of the testimony in which they originally appeared. Why? Two reasons; first because many of these recommendations cannot begin to improve America's ability to change the minds and opinions of the foreign public until well into the future and second, because many of the recommendations are so politically charged that they remain tied up in debate.

In reviewing much of the recent PD discourse, the U.S. should heed the two truisms that seem to rise above the cacophony of ideas and opinions. First, there is no silver bullet. Rather, the best approach is one which relies upon multiple means to demonstrate that America's actions and policies are not undertaken with callous disregard for the needs and cultures of foreign audiences. Second, that the efficacy of any PD effort will not be realized immediately, but rather will manifest itself over the long term.

In heeding the first, the USG should take James Fallows' advice that because it is impossible to know which message or medium will resonate best with foreign audiences, we should "use every tool we have".⁸⁹ In heeding the second, the USG should begin to identify and implement improvements to public diplomacy staying focused on the long-term results. Harnessing the military's voice is one such improvement that warrants a second look.

Appendix A: DSB Managed Information Dissemination Report

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

The Task Force recommends that the President issue a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination to (1) strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and thereby shape understanding of and support for U.S. national security policies, and (2) coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt international military information. The directive should require all regional and functional National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committees to (1) assess the potential impact of foreign public opinion when national security options are considered and (2) recommend or develop strategies for public information dissemination strategies before or in concert with policy implementation.

Recommendation 2

The Task Force recommends that the NSPD establish an NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination. The committee should be chaired by a person of Under Secretary rank designated by the Secretary of State. The chair will be assisted by a deputy designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Members of senior rank should be designated by the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and Commerce; the Attorney General; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Recommendation 3

The Task Force recommends that the NSPD delegate to the Policy Coordinating Committee and its Secretariat adequate authority to coordinate timely public diplomacy, public affairs, and open military information planning and dissemination activities, including the authority to require:

- Analysis of foreign public opinion and influence structures,*
- Development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis response communications,*
- Identify appropriate media channels, and*
- Produce information products.*

Recommendation 4

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State support the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination through a dedicated and expanded Secretariat in the Department of State consisting of the current interagency working group on international public information augmented by an expanded staff and budget and an executive secretary from the NSC staff. A robust, expanded, and multi-agency PCC Secretariat support staff, drawing upon expertise from DOS, DoD, the Joint Staff, 4th PSYOP Group, CIA, and commercial media and communications entities must be established to facilitate audience research and to develop channels and information products.

Recommendation 5

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State strengthen the Department of State's International Information Bureau under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary; substantially increase funding for Bureau activities intended to understand and influence foreign publics, with much of the increase for contracted products and services; and make these assets available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.

Recommendation 6

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State modernize and diversify the products and services of the Department of State's International Information Bureau to include significantly expanded use of Internet Web sites, streaming audio and video, and leased emerging satellite TV and FM radio broadcast channels; American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File print services for both direct distribution and distribution through foreign media channels; The Foreign Press Center by U.S. policymakers and military leaders to communicate with foreign publics through foreign press and media channels; Interactive information networks (and the associated databases) containing key foreign audiences and influence structures; Joint State-DoD training and increased interagency assignments; and A reserve cadre of retired, language-qualified State and DoD officers available for crisis response deployment.

Recommendation 7

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish an International Public Information Committee within DoD under OASD (SO/LIC) to coordinate all DoD open information programs carried out under the authority of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. DoD membership should include senior Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP and Joint Staff representatives.

Recommendation 8

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense implement DoD's draft OASD (SO/LIC) guidelines to Increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staff, Revitalize the CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans, Strengthen PSYOP capability to support the U.S. Government's strategic information programs, and Effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.

Recommendation 9

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense enhance DoD's information dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response requirements. In addition, the Secretary should make these capabilities available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the

Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. Enhancements include:

Expanded use of direct satellite FM radio and TV,

Additional use of regional magazines such as Forum and Dialogue,

Expanding use of regional Internet Web sites; and

Establishment of a public diplomacy office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation 10

The Task Force recommends that the President and his senior national security advisors strengthen U.S. international information dissemination by

Insisting that civilian and military information capabilities be harnessed to the Internet revolution,

Taking full advantage of commercial media production methods, and

Significantly increasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign media environments and influence structures.

Appendix B: DSB Strategic Communications Report

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

The Task Force recommends that the President issue a directive to: (a) strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to understand global public opinion, advise on the strategic implications of policymaking, and communicate with global audiences; (b) coordinate all components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military information operations; and (c) provide a foundation for new legislation on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of strategic communication.

Recommendation 2

The Task Force recommends that the President should establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the NSC and work with Congress to create legislation and funding for a:

*Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication;
Strategic Communication Committee within the NSC; and an
Independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication*

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should chair a Strategic Communication Committee. Its members should have the equivalent of under secretary rank and be designated by the Secretaries of State, Defense and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the White House Communications Director; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of the Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal authority, this Strategic Communication Committee should have authority to assign responsibilities and plan the work of departments and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations; concur in strategic communication personnel choices; shape strategic communication budget priorities; and provide program and project direction to a new Center for Strategic Communication.

Recommendation 3

The Task Force recommends that the President work with Congress to create legislation and funding for an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication to support the NSC and the departments and organizations represented on its Strategic Communication Committee. The Center should be a hybrid organization modeled on federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), such as the Rand Corporation, and the National Endowment for Democracy. It should be a tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) corporation that would receive an annual appropriation approved by Congress as part of the Department of State budget. The NSC's Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and the members of the Strategic Communication Committee should provide program and project direction to the Center. The Center for Strategic Communication should be governed by an

independent nonpartisan Board of Directors that would include distinguished Americans drawn from relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The NSC's Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should be an ex officio member of the Board. The Board of Directors should appoint the Center's Director and ensure mission coherence and quality of performance.

The Center should be guided by three purposes:

Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and military decision makers on issues vital to U.S. national security including global public opinion; the role of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior; media trends and influences on audiences, information technologies, the implications of all source intelligence assessments, and non-departmental, non-political advice that will sharpen their judgment and provide a basis for informed choices.

Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs for the creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies that embrace diplomatic opportunities and respond to national security threats.

Support government strategic communications through services provided on a cost recovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information; maintain knowledge management systems, language and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector experts for short term assignments, deploy temporary communications teams; augment planning, recruitment, and training; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness.

Recommendation 4

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State redefine the role and responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy. The Under Secretary should serve as the Department's principal on the NSC's Strategic Communication Committee; have adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation; direct the Department's foreign opinion and media research activities; approve senior public diplomacy assignments; and review the performance ratings of public diplomacy office director and embassy public affairs officers. All foreign policy initiatives and directives should have a public diplomacy component approved by the Under Secretary. The Department's current resources (personnel & funding) for public diplomacy should be tripled from current levels and placed under the control of the Under Secretary. The Department should provide a core funding grant to the Center for Strategic Communication in the amount of an annual appropriation in the Department's budget.

Recommendation 5

The Task Force recommends that public diplomacy office directors in the Department of State should be at the level of deputy assistant secretary or senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary. Officers promoted to Chief of Mission positions or the Senior Foreign Service should have served at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment in the Department or in an interagency assignment relevant to public diplomacy. The Bureau of International Information Programs should be directed by an Assistant Secretary.

Recommendation 6

The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should act as the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the Department's principal on the NSC's Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee. The Under Secretary for Policy should coordinate strategic communication activities with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should extend the role and responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to act as the Department's focal point for military support of public diplomacy and create a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs to coordinate all activities associated with military support for public diplomacy; and provide adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation.

Recommendation 7

The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components, ensure collaboration with the Department of State's diplomatic missions and with theater security cooperation plans; and extend U.S. STRATCOM's and U.S. SOCOM's Information Operations responsibilities to include DoD support for public diplomacy. The Department should triple current resources (personnel & funding) available to combatant commanders for DoD support to public diplomacy and reallocate Information Operations funding within U.S. STRATCOM for expanded support for strategic communication programs.

Appendix C: Task Force Falcon during Operation Iraqi Freedom⁹⁰

In May 2003, following the cessation of so-called “major combat operations” in Iraq, the 82nd Airborne Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team, nicknamed “Task Force Falcon,” was detached from the 82nd Airborne Division, attached to the 3rd Infantry Division and given responsibility for the Al Rashid District of Baghdad. This district included a local population of approximately 1.2 million Iraqis.

At the onset, Task Force Falcon Commander, COL Arnold Bray discerned two distinct and equally important tasks for the Brigade, the simultaneous conduct of security and civil-military operations. Recognizing the difficulties of trying to coordinate these disparate activities with only one staff, COL Bray sub-assigned responsibility for the Brigade’s civil-military efforts to his artillery battalion commander and Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD). Echoing this construct, each of the Brigade’s subordinate maneuver battalion commanders tasked his respective Fire Support Officer to serve as the coordinator for battalion-level civil-military operations.

The use of FSCOORD’s in this manner was not unusual. Commanders typically turned to these individuals for a variety of reasons. First, the transition away from major combat operations brought with it a reduced need for fire support, freeing these individuals to fill other vital needs. Second, ground force commanders considered the impact of civil-military operations a non-lethal “effect” requiring coordination, thus the FSCOORD’s evolving doctrinal role as “effects coordinators” seemed a natural fit.⁹¹ Lastly, the unit FSCOORD’s intimate knowledge and understanding of his supported unit and commander, when paired with his relative seniority and operational focus, provided a high degree of confidence by commanders in their FSCOORD’s ability to transition from warfighting to civil military operations.

Task Force Falcon's shift to stability and support operations included a "re-tooling" of its staff as well as individual staff officer responsibilities. COL Bray resourced his FSCOORD by sub-assigning members of the brigade staff to include: the IO officer (previously attached to the Brigade from Division staff, following the departure of the 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters from theater), the attached Civil Affairs element and other brigade-level staff officers and NCOs not intimately involved in the security mission. The FSCOORD combined these various entities with members of his own staff and functionally organized them to plan, coordinate and execute the brigade's civil-military effort.

The Brigade's Information Operations Officer, a Major, was by trade a Psychological Operations (PSYOP) expert and the only member of the staff formally trained in communicating messages to foreign audiences. The Brigade's two attached Public Affairs Paratroopers included a Specialist trained as a photographer, and a Sergeant trained as a journalist. The Brigade's PSYOP included three Tactical PSYOP teams, consisting of three PSYOP Soldiers and a Category One interpreter, each attached to a subordinate Infantry Battalion, and the Tactical PSYOP Detachment Headquarters consisting of a PSYOP Captain and Sergeant First Class, located at the Brigade Headquarters. The PSYOP mission of supporting the brigade's security mission precluded any real PSYOP contribution to the civil-military effort. The brigade's Civil Affairs element consisted of approximately 22 reservists from the rank of Major through Specialist, each with a different specialty and capability but none trained in any communications discipline. These Civil Affairs operators worked in teams attached to each infantry battalion, as well as a coordinating staff attached to the brigade headquarters. The remaining members of this ad hoc organization were combat arms, combat support and combat service support Soldiers, each performing functions outside their areas of expertise.

Capable and motivated, these staff officers, NCO's and specialists took on their newly assigned civil-military responsibilities with rigor and a clear sense of urgency all while maintaining their original, though reduced, warfighting responsibilities. Efforts included an incredible variety of disparate tasks, most non-military in nature, and each a significant public diplomacy opportunity. When possible the Brigade Commander personally endeavored to engage the local public. He did this primarily in three ways. First, he attended and participated in the various advisory councils established within the Brigade's Area of Operations. Second, he developed and presented awards to deserving members of the community. This award, a simple plaque imbued with an Iraqi and U.S. Flag, the Brigade's crest, and an inscription that read "Friend of Al Rashid," was used to publicly recognize the commitment and sacrifices of selected local Iraqi officials who had significantly helped improve the lives of their fellow citizens. Third, he engaged the public through publication of a newspaper that highlighted positive accomplishments, discussed setbacks and negative events, and served to provide information about the Brigade Commander's personal engagement to a wider audience.

Among the most publicly visible tasks of the civil-military efforts were:

- Establishing and mentoring neighborhood and district advisory councils to ascertain the local population's security concerns and priorities for coalition reconstruction efforts; and to teach and train them on the rudiments of local governance and the democratic process (this became the foundation for localized political representation)
- Establishing a local newspaper to not only provide general information on coalition activities, but to promote the desire and need for cooperation between coalition forces and the local civilian population

- Assessing local critical service and infrastructure repair needs to include: emergency services (fire, police, and ambulance), medical services (hospitals, clinics, and medicine), sewer, water, food distribution, fuel distribution (for vehicles, heating and cooking), communications (telephone and Internet), garbage and “war hulk” removal, local power lines and more
- Letting contracts and coordinating payments to local workers for local reconstruction efforts using funds from the Commander’s Emergency Reconstruction Program (CERP)
- Coordinating reconstruction, relief and aid efforts through and with members of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), USAID and the myriad of Non-Governmental Organizations, and executing these efforts side by side with the local population

Though the individuals tasked with these endeavors did yeoman’s work, and the specialties involved indeed remained vital components to the force, none were public diplomacy experts. Additionally, because these staff members were neither trained nor versed in public diplomacy, the full benefit that could have been derived from a more deliberate and sustained public diplomacy approach was not realized. Further, no similar organizational change within the 3rd Infantry Division (and later the 1st Armored Division) were evident, so this ad hoc capability realized in the Falcon Brigade was not replicated at higher headquarters. Therefore the Falcon’s higher headquarters were not prepared to support or leverage the successes for a greater gain across Baghdad. Perhaps most significantly, as insurgent activities increased in Al Rashid, the Brigade was less able to afford to divert the officers, NCO’s and Soldiers from their primary warfighting roles. Thus the Brigade’s efforts to engage the local populace dropped precipitously.

Appendix D: Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)

In addition to the State and Defense Departments and other government agencies, the Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2004 Performance and Accountability Report served to fulfill, among other things, the requirements of the GPRA. Specifically, Section 2, Performance Information, discusses performance objectives and outcomes.⁹² The BBG programs, “Broadcasting to Africa” and “Broadcasting to Near East Asia and South Asia,” were rated as Moderately Effective with three key performance measures identified for each program.

State Department’s Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is embarking on its initial effort to develop its performance measures in compliance with the PART.⁹³ Expertise for this effort is being drawn from the individuals in the Department who participated in developing the performance measures for Educational and Cultural Exchanges, included in the 2003 PART.

How the PART Works

The PART evaluation proceeds through four critical areas of assessment---purpose and design, strategic planning, management, and results and accountability.

The first set of questions gauges whether the programs’ design and purpose are clear and defensible. The second section involves strategic planning, and weighs whether the agency sets valid annual and long-term goals for programs. The third section rates agency management of programs, including financial oversight and program improvement efforts. The fourth set of questions focuses on results that programs can report with accuracy and consistency.

The answers to questions in each of the four sections result in a numeric score for each section from 0 to 100 (100 being the best). These scores are then combined to achieve an overall qualitative rating that ranges from Effective, to Moderately Effective, to Adequate, to Ineffective. Programs that do not have acceptable performance measures h=or have not yet collected performance data generally receive a rating of Results Not Demonstrated.

While single, weighted scores can be calculated, the value of reporting, say, an overall 46 out of 100 can be misleading. Reporting a single numerical rating could suggest false precision, or draw attention away from the very areas most in need of improvement. In fact, the PART is best seen as a complement to traditional management techniques, and can be used to stimulate a constructive dialogue between program managers, budget analysts, and policy officials. The PART serves its purpose if it produces an honest starting point for spending decisions that take results seriously.

Source: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy04/pdf/budget/prperformance.pdf>

Appendix E: List of Interviews

NAME	POSITION	OFFICE / AGENCY
Bacon, Kenneth H.	CEO, Refugees International; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (1994-2001)	Refugees International
Bond, Michael (Mai)	Information Operations Officer	JCS, J3
Bray, Arnold N. G. (COL)	Former Commander, 2 nd Brigade, 82 nd Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Feb – Jul 2003	TRADOC Futures, Fort Monroe, VA.
Brenner, James (COL)	Deputy Director Global Operations (DDGO), PSYOP Division	JCS, J3
Bynum, Alan E. (Col)	HQ STRATCOM Liaison	JCS, J3
Curtin, Jeremy F. (Mr.)	Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs	Department of State
Devlin, Daniel (Mr.)	Deputy Director	SO/LIC SO&CT (PSYOP Policy)
Frederick, Brian (Mr.)	Director of Information	Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Plans, & Resources (PDUSD(P))
Giusti, Lawrence (COL)	Chief of Staff	SO/LIC SO&CT (PSYOP Policy)
Gough, Susan (LTC)	Director, Civil Affairs and Strategic Influence U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute	U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College
Gregory, Bruce (PROF)	Professor and Director of Public Diplomacy; Member Defense Science Board; Member Council of Foreign Relations	Director, Institute of Public Diplomacy, George Washington University
Holzhauser, Robin L. (Ms.)	Deputy Director, Public Diplomacy, School of Professional and Area Studies, Foreign Service Institute	Department of State
Matheny, John (Mr.)	Director, PSYOP Policy; Participant, Defense Science Board Strategic Communications Study	SO/LIC SO&CT (PSYOP Policy)
Miller, Janet (Ms.)	Director, Public Diplomacy, School of Professional and Area Studies, Foreign Service Institute	Department of State
Nye, Joseph (PROF)	Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations	John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Parker, William V. (Mr.)	Political Advisor	STRATCOM/CC07
Parrish, Dean (SGM)	DDGO	JCS, J3
Pasquerrette, Michael J. (Mr.)	Professor, National Security Strategy & Military Planning	Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College
Petersen, R.B. (Mr.)	Special Assistant, Office of Strategic Communications, Bureau of International Information Programs	Department of State
Schoenhaus, Robert (Mr.)	GS, SOCOM Liaison	SOCOM, Washington Office
Slovanic, Gregory L. (RADM)	Public Affairs Officer	Multi-National Forces, Iraq OCJCS/PA
Timmes, Thomas (Mr.)	Contractor, SAIC; Participant, Defense Science Board Managed	SO/LIC SO&CT (PSYOP Policy)

	Information Dissemination Study	
Vitto, Vincent (Mr.)	Vice Chairman, Defense Science Board; President & CEO, Draper Laboratories	Defense Science Board
Whitaker, Elizabeth A. (Ms.)	Director of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs	Department of State

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- ² Tom Timmes, personal interview, 29 Nov. 2004. Mr. Timmes suggested the general concept for a bottom-up review during an interview at the Pentagon. He served as the executive secretary for the Defense Science Board's Managed Information Dissemination Task Force in Oct. 2001, and currently serves as a contractor within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.
- ³ Though it has not been stated anywhere, this may at least be part of the reason why DoD has chosen not to include public diplomacy among its own strategic communications activities.
- ⁴ James Fallows, "Success without Victory," The Atlantic Monthly Online Jan/Feb 2005, 25 Feb. 2005 <<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200501/fallows>>.
- ⁵ United States, The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: Sept. 2002) 31.
- ⁶ Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, "How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder # 1645 (23 Apr. 2003): 3, 21 Jan. 2005 <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1645.cfm>>. This generalized definition for public diplomacy was derived from that used by the former U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and others found in the various public diplomacy studies reviewed for this study. USIA formally defined public diplomacy as promoting the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.
- ⁷ Edward P. Djerejian, Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World (Washington: 1 Oct. 2003) 13-14. Also available at <<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf>>.
- ⁸ Stephen C. Johnson, "Improving U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East," Heritage Lecture #838 24 May 2004, 21 Oct. 2004 <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl838.cfm>>. Author Stephen C. Johnson recognized that the Department of Defense, through the Coalition Provisional Authority had the de facto lead for public diplomacy in Iraq. He stated that this reality came about both as a result of the cutbacks to the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus as well as the Administration's preference for the military's mission-oriented culture over State's process-oriented culture. While the article focused primarily on broadcast media-based public diplomacy (PD) efforts, it suggests a tremendous potential for military involvement in PD as well as raising legitimate concerns.
- ⁹ Johnson and Dale.
- ¹⁰ Barry Zorthian, Council on Foreign Relations, Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy (Washington: Sept. 2003) 56-57, 18 Feb. 2005 <http://www.cfr.org/pdf/public_diplomacy.pdf>.
- ¹¹ Thomas E. Ricks, "Army Contests Rumsfeld Bid on Occupation; Special Operations Would Lose Cadre of Nation-Building Civil Affairs Troops," The Washington Post 16 Jan. 2005 Lexis-Nexis, Harvard University 18 Jan. 2005.
- ¹² Greg Jaffe, ts, Secretary Rumsfeld Telephone Interview, 6 Dec. 2004 13 Jan. 2005 <<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20041206-secdef1766.html>>.
- In a 6 Dec. 2004 telephone interview with Wall Street Journal reporter Greg Jaffe regarding the current situation in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked, "Well, it's like anything else, these transitions, if you think of the circumstance we're in today in Afghanistan and Iraq, we're not in a military situation. The military situation is manageable in each place. What we're in is a situation where all elements of our country and of our coalition partners need to be engaged. It is simultaneously a security issue, to be sure, but not from a military battle standpoint. It's a police situation. It's a communications issue – set of issues there, in terms of strategic communications and managing perceptions. *That isn't a Defense Department task, as such.* (emphasis added)"
- ¹³ During interviews with various Pentagon officials, the Economy Act was put forward as one of the obstacles standing in the way of DoD public diplomacy. The Economy Act regulates the use of funds by one agency to pursue efforts that are the primary responsibility of another.
- ¹⁴ Djerejian, 13.
- ¹⁵ Djerejian, 10-11.
- ¹⁶ Defense Science Board, Strategic Communications, i.
- ¹⁷ Jeffrey B. Jones, e-mail to LTC Steve Smith, 29 Mar. 2005.

- ¹⁸ Lawrence Giusti, e-mail to LTC Steve Smith, 29 Mar. 2005.
- ¹⁹ Giusti, 13.
- ²⁰ Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Managed Information Dissemination (Washington: Oct. 2001), 19, 28 Sept. 2004 <<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/mid.pdf>>.
- ²¹ Defense Science Board, Strategic Communications, 6.
- ²² Department of Defense, Draft Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3600.1, "Information Operations", undated. This draft directive defines *Defense Support to Public Diplomacy* as those activities and measures taken by the DoD components to support and facilitate the overt public diplomacy efforts of United States Government (USG) Departments and Agencies that are designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives.
- ²³ Department of Defense, Draft Department of Defense Directive DoDD 3000.cc, "Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities." 17 Sept. 2004, 2.
- ²⁴ Department of Defense, Information Operations Briefing, (Washington: Sep. 2004), slide 4.
- ²⁵ Thomas Timmes, e-mail to LTC Smith, 14 Feb. 2005. Mr. Timmes explained the genesis of the term IMI as follows, "On 23 Nov. 1998, there was an interagency ASD-level meeting at the OEOB attended by ASD(SO/LIC) Allen Holmes and I to conduct a final review of the draft PDD-68 before formal interagency staffing. The State Department representative objected to "PSYOP" being one of the three components of IPI (PA, PD, PSYOP) and suggested DoD identify another term for PSYOP, which we did on the spot – IMI. Even though the term IMI was conceived as a euphemism for PSYOP at the time, the term was never included in Joint Publication 1-02 (DoD Dictionary), and is thus available to be redefined."
- ²⁶ This diagram was developed from a PowerPoint slide developed for Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, a copy of which was provided to the study group by COL James Brenner, Deputy Director Global Operations, PSYOP Division, JCS J3 during an interview at the Pentagon.
- ²⁷ The study group conducted a series of interviews at the Pentagon with a number of individuals directly involved in the development of Strategic Communications and Information Operations policies and concepts. See Appendix A for a complete listing of individual interviews conducted as a part of this research effort.
- ²⁸ United States, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Building America's Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources, (Washington: 2002), 8, 24 October 2004 <<http://state.gov/documents/organization/13622.pdf>>
- ²⁹ General Accounting Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, (Washington: Sept. 2003), 6.
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- ³³ James Fallows, "Success without Victory," The Atlantic Monthly Online, Jan/Feb 2005 25 Feb. 2005 <<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200501/fallows>>.
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- ³⁸ Timmes, personal interview. Mr. Timmes suggested a general concept for a bottom-up review during our interview at the Pentagon.
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- ⁴⁰ Russell W. Glenn, "No More Principles of War?," Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly Spring 1998, Figure 1, 7 Jan. 2005 <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/no_more_principles.htm>.
- ⁴¹ United States Army, Field Manual (FM) 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations, (Washington: 31 May 1997) 1-1.
- ⁴² The study group conducted a detailed review of applicable doctrine, schoolhouse programs of instruction and interviews with military instructors from the Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, Foreign Area Officer and PSYOP career fields. The research indicated an absence of military instruction and doctrine for public diplomacy.

- ⁴³ Though it has not been stated anywhere, this may at least be part of the reason why DoD has chosen not to include public diplomacy among its own strategic communications activities.
- ⁴⁴ United States Army, 101st Airborne Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Report, 22 Jan. 2004, 2.
- ⁴⁵ Timmes, e-mail to LTC Smith, 13 Jan. 2005.
- ⁴⁶ Richard Halloran, "Crisis Image Alert," The Washington Times 23 Jan. 2005, B3.
- ⁴⁷ Jim-Fisher Thompson quoting AMB David Shinn, "Greater U.S. Public Diplomacy Effort Urged in Horn of Africa," All American Patriots, 20 Dec. 2004 15 Jan. 2005 <<http://www.allamericanpatriots.com/m-news+article+storyid-4084.html>>.
- ⁴⁸ Vince Vitto, personal interview, 18 Jan. 2005. A good bit of energy has already been spent attempting to identify these so-called "bright lines of distinction" along the continuum portrayed in the diagram, to clearly articulate where public affairs gives way to public diplomacy and public diplomacy to PSYOP. Any substantive progress by DoD to otherwise address the military's ability to conduct effective public diplomacy has been stymied by its fixation on establishing this conceptual dividing line. During the interview with Mr. Vince Vitto, chairman of the DSB's Strategic Communications Task Force, Mr. Vitto was dismayed over the military's seeming inability to get beyond what he believes is a wasted effort given the realities of the global information environment. While it works well in PowerPoint, it loses much of its efficacy when applied to the reality of the information age. Because messages designed to inform, influence, or modify the behavior of a specific audience can not be delivered with precision accuracy, they are often echoed elsewhere resulting in unintended consequence. Instead, DoD should remove itself from this conceptual 'do loop' and place its emphasis where it can truly make a difference.
- ⁴⁹ Daniel Devlin, personal interview, 29 Nov. 2004. Mr. Devlin provided insight regarding differences between PA and PSYOP efforts. Additionally, he provided a similar diagram to the one depicted in this chapter to demonstrate what he termed 'the information continuum.' The study group leveraged his idea to create the chart presented in the report.
- ⁵⁰ Johnson and Dale.
- ⁵¹ National Defense University, "Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience," (Washington: 27 Sep. 2004) 13.
- ⁵² Department of Defense, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (CM) 2077-04 - Policy on Public Affairs Relationship to Information Operations," (Washington: 27 Sep. 2004).
- ⁵³ Voice of America Online Press Kit 4 Mar. 2005 6 Mar. 2005 <<http://www.voanews.com/english/about/OnlinePressKit.cfm>>. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 bars the domestic dissemination of official American information aimed at foreign audiences.
- ⁵⁴ It is necessary to note that there are some within the PSYOP Community who do not fully concur with the National Defense University study.
- ⁵⁵ Jack Spencer, "Focusing Defense Resources to Meet National Security Requirements," The Heritage Foundation, 21 Mar. 2003, 5-6, 9 Mar. 2005 <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1638.cfm>>.
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- ⁶⁰ Greg Jaffe, "As Chaos Mounts In Iraq, U.S. Army Rethinks Its Future Amid Signs Its Plan Fell Short, Service Sees Benefits Of Big Tanks, Translators," Wall Street Journal, 8 Dec. 2004, ed., A1.
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- ⁶³ Department of Defense, CJCSI 1800.01B.
- ⁶⁴ Janet Miller, telephone interview, 11 Feb. 2005.
- ⁶⁵ Col Alan E. Bynum, USAF, telephone interview, 9 Feb 2005.
- ⁶⁶ Morton Kondracke, "Army and Marines should be top priority," Decatur Daily Democrat 21 Mar. 2005 23 Mar. 2005 <<http://www.decaterdailydemocrat.com/articles/2005/03/21/news/opinion/editorial04.prt>>.

- ⁶⁷ United States Air Force, "Air Force Doctrine Document 1," 17 Nov. 2003, i, 1 Mar 2004 <<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/afdc/dd/afdd1/afdd1.pdf>>.
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- ⁶⁹ United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 1, ix.
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- ⁷¹ Department of Defense, "JP 5-00.1".
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